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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
January 1, 1980, marked the tenth anniversary of the enact-
ment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA or the 
Act).1 The purpose of its enactment was to require federal agen-
cies to consider the possible environmental consequences of their 
actions.2 Toward this end, the environmental impact statement 
(EIS) requirement3 was intended as an "action forcing" provi-
sion, insuring the preparation of a document that would demon-
strate that an agency is complying with the mandated analysis 
examining the possible environmental impact of its actions. 4 
After ten years of court interpretation, there continues to be 
a considerable amount of litigation concerning the meaning and 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). Section 4342 of NEPA established the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to promulgate guidelines for compliance with the Act to 
lie used by federal agencies. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.i-1500.10 (1978). Although the previous 
guidelines were advisory only, new guidelines issued effective July 30, 1979, are binding 
on all federal agencies. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978). 
2. Section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976); CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 
1500.2 (1978). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE HANDBOOK (1976); 2 F. GRAD, The National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, in TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch.9 (1978 & Supp., 1979); R. LIROFF, ANA· 
T10NAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITs AFTERMATH (1976); PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LITIGATION (1976); 
Sive, Environmental Decisionmaking: Judicial and Political Review, 28 Case W. RES. L. 
REV. 827 (1978); McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. 
L. REV. 801 (1977). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[A Jll agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . . 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals 
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed state-
ment by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and ' 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should 
it be implemented. 
See generally M. Baker, J. Kaming, and R. Morrison, Environmental Impact Statements: 
A Guide to Preparation and Review (1977); Symposium on the Environmental Impact 
Statement, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243 (1976). 
4. Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. the Real World, 
49 PUB. INTEREST 22, 24 (1977). 
205 
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scope of NEPA. The continued controversy has been caused in 
part by the unclear language of the Act, unilluminated by its 
legislative history.5 More significantly, the Act has given environ-
mental groups a legal and political weapon that they have used 
"to cancel, delay, or modify development projects that they op-
pose."8 These plaintiffs most often use the technical and proce-
dural requirements of NEPA to challenge agency action through 
lawsuits alleging a failure to prepare an EIS or, if an EIS has been 
prepared, attacking its scope or content.7 
During the Survey period, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in its consideration of challenges to agency action under 
NEPA, focused its decisions on an interpretation of what consti-
tutes major federal action that significantly affects the human 
environment. The court also considered issues relating to the tim-
ing of an EIS and standing to sue.S 
I. MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION 
A. IMPLEMENTATION BY FEDERAL AGENCY OF LONG-RANGE 
REGIONAL PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT 
During the Survey period, the Ninth Circuit expanded the 
scope of NEPA by ruling that development and implementation 
of long-range regional proposals by federal officials were major 
federal actions. 
In Port of Astoria, Oregon u. Hodel, U an action was brought 
to declare void a contract for the supply of electrical power by the 
Bonneville Power Administration (BP A) 10 to Alumax Pacific Cor-
poration (Alum ax) . Plaintiffs 11 alleged that the execution of the 
5. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,1319 (9th Cir. 
1974) (en bane). 
6. See Bardach and Pugliaresi, supra note 4, at 23. 
7. Anderson & Rosencranz, The Future of Environmental Defense, 61 A.B.A.J. 316 
(1975). The authors criticized the primary emphasis on litigation and proposed alternative 
strategies. 
8. See California Tahoe Regional Planning Ag'cy v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 
Feb., 1979), for the court's most recent interpretation of the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Compact. Note, Environmental Law, Ninth Circuit Survey, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
571 (1976) for a survey of cases addressed by the Ninth Circuit on these and other environ-
mental issues during the 1974-1975 Survey term. 
9. 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were 
Kennedy, J., and Jameson, D.J.). 
10. BPA, a federal agency, markets hydroelectric power generated by federal dams 
on the Columbia River. [d. at 471. 
11. Plaintiffs were the Port of Astoria (Port), Concerned Citizens of Clatsop County 
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contract was major federal action and should be voided since no 
EIS had been prepared. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's holding that, although an EIS would have to b~ prepared 
before inplementation of the contract, the contract was not void. 12 
The contract between BPA and Alumax required that BPA 
build power lines and supply industrial firm powerl3 to an alumi-
num reduction plant that Alumax planned to build in Umatilla 
County, Oregon (the Umatilla contract)." BPA had previously 
initiated the Hydro Thermal Power Program in order to meet the 
expanding needs of its existing and new customers. 15 Under Phase 
2 of the program, BPA was to act as sales agent to its industrial 
customers for the power produced by thermal generating plants 
to be built by non-federal utilities. The industrial firm power 
contracts of Phase 2 provided an advance market for the thermal 
plant's output, thereby helping to partially finance the building 
of those plants. The contracts also provided industries with the 
power commitments they needed before they could build. The 
end result of the program was to provide for and to promote 
regional industrial growth and expansion. 
In the district court and on appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the 
execution of the Umatilla contract was major federal action re-
quiring preparation of an EIS because it: 1) changed the site of 
the proposed plant; 2) enabled construction and operation of the 
Umatilla plant and transmission lines necessary to service it; 3) 
obligated BPA to supply large amounts of power to Alumax; and 
4) was the first industrial firm power contract thus initiating 
Phase 2 of the Hydro Thermal Program. 18 The plaintiffs further 
(Concerned Citizens), Hermiston Broadcasting Company, and five named individuals 
who were either members of Concerned Citizens or residents of Umatilla County. [d. at 
473. 
12. [d. at 479-80. 
13. The grades of power to be supplied ranged from "interruptible power," subject 
to restriction at BPA's discretion, to "firm power" which, apart from unavoidable circum-
stances, had to be continuously supplied. "Industrial firm power" does not denote a 
particular grade of power but a method for distributing power to industry. [d. at 471-72. 
14. In 1966, BPA contracted with Northwest Aluminum Company to supply power 
to a plant to be built in Clatsop County, Oregon (the Warrenton contract). In 1970, that 
contract was assigned to Alumax. In 1975, Alumax decided to change the proposed plant's 
site from Clatsop County to Umatilla County. [d. at 473. 
15. [d. at 471. Under Phase 1 of the Hydro Thermal Power Program, initiated in 1968, 
BPA planned to buy power from non-federal utilities and sell it to its industrial customers. 
In response to funding and accounting problems with Phase I, Phase 2 was initiated in 
1973. [d. at 471-72. 
16. [d. at 473-74. 
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requested that the EIS include consideration of the Phase 2 as-
pects of the contract.17 BPA argued that its contractual commit-
ment, the Warrenton contract, antedated NEPA, and that it was, 
therefore, not obligated to prepare an EIS on the Umatilla plant. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the Uma-
tilla contract was, in terms of significant environmental conse-
quences, "an entirely new project affecting an area not contem-
plated in earlier contracts between BPA and Alumax or its prede-
cessors."18 Therefore, this was "further major federal action" that 
required BPA to prepare an EIS on the Umatilla plant and the 
power transmission lines. 19 
The Ninth Circuit further required that an EIS be prepared 
on Phase 2 of the Hydro Thermal Power Program which would 
include consideration of industry's role in Phase 2 and an assess-
ment of the new energy commitment to Alumax.2o The court 
found that the execution of the Umatilla contract was a proposal 
for major federal action not only because it was a new commit-
ment of BPA's energy resources but because it also set the stage 
for the initiation of Phase 2.21 The court rejected BPA's assertion 
that Phase 2 was not a federal program in finding that BPA's 
participation integrated, and was essential to, the entire pro-
gram.22 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus,23 the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in a ruling that relied on Port of Astoria, held that a regional 
plan to market water was major federal action. In 1967, the De-
partment of Interior began a program to market water from the 
Yellowtail and Boysen Reservoirs for industrial use.24 As part of 
this program, seventeen option contracts for the industrial use of 
17. [d. at 474. 
18. [d. at 477. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. at 478. 
23. 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (modified and rehearing den., June, 1979) (per 
curiam). 
24. The reservoirs are located in the Northern Great Plains region, the economy of 
which is predominantly agricultural. However, the region contains one of the richest 
strippable coal deposits in the world. The availability of water for industrial uses is a key 
factor in making stripmining feasible. [d. at 850. See Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal 
Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 Law and Contemp. Prob. 77, 77-78 (1976); 
Stewart and Leary, How Coal Will Change the West, S.F. Examiner, July 22, 1979, at 1, 
col. 4 (previewed.). 
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water were executed between 1969 and 1971. No EIS was pre-
pared for either the marketing program or the individual option 
contracts.25 Plaintiffs, a coalition of environmental, wildlife and 
agricultural organizations, filed suit against the Secretary ofInte-
rior alleging that the sale of water from those projects was in 
violation of the Flood Control Act. 28 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, finding no violation of the 
Flood Control Act, but reversed the district court's holding that 
an EIS was not required.27 The court found the water marketing 
plan to be a proposal for major federal action28 and the option 
contracts to amount to federal action which, by its terms, made 
an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of available re-
sources."29 As such, both the water marketing plan and each indi-
vidual option contract required the preparation of an EIS.30 
B. THE COURT'S REASONING 
In determining whether or not there was major federal ac-
tion, the court examined not only the specific action in contro-
versy, but also whether that action was part of a larger, and more 
environmentally significant, program. In Environmental Defense 
Fund, the Secretary never disputed the need for preparation of 
an EIS for each individual option contract.3t Similarly, in Port of 
Astoria, SPA did not dispute that the Umatilla contract was 
major federal action significantly affecting the environment. 
What BPA did dispute was whether that contract was further 
major federal action requiring an EIS.32 
In response, the Port of Astoria court, in accord with previous 
25. 596 F.2d at 851. 
26. [d. at 849. Enacted in 1944, the Flood Control Act authorized the establishment 
of water projects in the Missouri River Basin. 33 U.S.C. § 701·1 (1944). The Yellowstone 
and Boysen Reservoirs, which were the subject of the litigation, were both authorized 
water projects under the Act. [d. at 850. 
27. [d. at 849·50. 
28. [d. at 851. 
29. [d. at 852. 
30. [d. at 853. "These requirements are applicable even though the marketing plan 
and some of the option contracts were executed prior to January I, 1970. Both ... are 
ongoing and require continuing attention and action." Id. 
31. [d. at 852. What was in dispute was the timing of the EIS. See text accompanying 
notes 87·89 infra. 
32. 595 F.2d at 477. 
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Ninth Circuit decisions33 and decisions of a majority of the cir-
cuits,34 held that "an EIS is required to assess a major federal 
project initiated before the effective date of NEPA when the pro-
ject entails a further major action that would occur after NEPA's 
effective date and that would significantly affect the quality of 
the human environment."35 Here, the Umatilla contract allowed 
Alumax to change the site of the proposed plant, initiating an 
entirely new project not contemplated in the previous contract.36 
In both Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund, 
the major dispute centered around whether long-range regional 
proposals were major federal actions. The determinations that 
the proposals were major federal actions were based primarily 
upon the court's concern with the possibility of long-term, signifi-
cant environmental impact that might result from implementa-
tion of those programs. 
The Umatilla contract, in itself a significant concern of the 
court in Port of Astoria, assumed its full importance when seen 
as the first step in the implementation of Phase 2 of the Hydro 
Thermal Power Program.37 The Umatilla contract, like other firm 
power contracts BPA planned to make, contained a provision 
whereby BPA could require its industrial customers either to shift 
the source of power from BP A to a Phase 2 thermal plant or to 
accept a restrictable grade of power from BPA. This contract 
33. See San Francisco Tommorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(amendments to loan contracts which increased federal funding only to provide for rising 
costs of San Francisco redevelopment project did not constitute further major federal 
action; but, change from industrial park project to neighborhood development program 
in Berkeley after the effective date of NEPA was major federal action); Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1973) (NEPA applies to all 
major federal actions taken after January 1, 1970, regardless of whether project to which 
the action is related was initiated prior to that date). 
For a recent case in which the Ninth Circuit found no further major federal action, 
see Westside Prop. Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1223-24 (9th Cir. May, 1979) 
(post-NEPA formalization of pre-NEPA agreement not further major federal action). 
34. Accord, Hart v. Denver Urb. Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178, 1181 (10th Cir. 1977); 
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 
885,891 (lst Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164,1177 (6th 
Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1972); Greene County Plan-
ning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412,424 (2d Cir. 1972); CEQ Guidelines, 40 
C.F.R. § § 1506.12, 1508.18(a) (1978). Contra, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. 
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F .2d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1118 (1973). 
35. 595 F.2d at 477. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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prOVISIOn was intended to provide an advance market for the 
thermal plant's output, helping to finance the plants and allow 
the non-federal utilities to build plants larger than those dictated 
by the current demand. 3s The end result was to provide for in-
dustrial expansion by establishing a reserve of electrical power. 
The court held that Phase 2 was clearly a long-range regional 
program which could have a substantial environmental impact39 
and, as such, was a proposal for major federal action within the 
contemplation of section 4332 (2)(C) of the Act.40 
In Environmental Defense Fund, the court took a substan-
tially similar approach in assessing the industrial water market-
ing program. Prior to the marketing program, no reservoir water 
had been set aside for industrial use. The availability of water for 
industrial use was a key factor of feasibility in developing the 
region's strippable coal deposits. Since water is a limited resource 
throughout the region, "[a]llocation of the region's water re-
sources will determine the nature and extent of future develop-
ment, whether agricultural or industrial."41 
Although the Secretary of Interior had developed an in-
dustrial water marketing program and had executed option con-
tracts committing hundreds of thousands of acre feet of water in 
accordance with that program, no EIS had been prepared for 
either the marketing program or the individual option contracts. 
In finding that there had been a proposal for major federal action 
which could significantly affect the environment,42 the court held 
that an EIS must be prepared for both the marketing plan and 
each individual option contract.43 
When the federal courts first considered whether major fed-
eral actions would have a significant cumulative regional impact, 
the trend was to require the preparation of an EIS not only for 
the specific actions, but also one for· the total effect on the re-
gional environment. 44 In 1976, the United States Supreme Court 
·38. [d. at 472. The shift from BPA power to thermal power would result in higher 
costs to the industrial customers. 
39. [d. at 478. 
40. [d. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)(1970). For the statutory language of § 4332 (2)(C) see 
note 3 supra. 
41. 596 F.2d at 850. 
42. [d. at 851. 
43. [d. 
44. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786,795 (9th Cir. 1975) (EIS on coal leases covering 
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in Kleppe v. Sierra Club45 imposed a stricter standard.46 
The plaintiffs in Kleppe, several environmental organiza-
tions, brought suit requesting that even though an EIS had been 
prepared for specific coal mining plans, further development of 
coal reserves in the Northern Great Plains region should not be 
allowed until a comprehensive regional EIS was prepared. Al-
though finding no regional plan or program, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia reversed the district court and re-
quired preparation of a regional EIS, concluding that such a plan 
was "contemplated" for the regionY The Supreme Court, in re-
versing the appellate court, found all proposals for development 
of coal resources to be of either local or national scope.48 The court 
ruled that, "[iln the absence of a proposal for a regional plan of 
development, there is nothing that could be the subject of the 
analysis envisioned by [NEPAl for an impact statement."49 
In both Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund, 
the Ninth Circuit distinguished Kleppe in finding regional pro-
grams that required preparation of an EIS. The Port of Astoria 
court found that BPA had prepared and released a proposal for a 
regional program expanding the development and distribution of 
power resources in a document entitled "Hydro Thermal Program 
Phase 2."50 In Environmental Defense Fund, the court found the 
option contracts to be a part of a regional industrial water mar-
770 acres of 30,876 acre program not sufficient); see also Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., 
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Named Individ-
ual Members of San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013,1021. 
22 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). Contra, Nucleus on Chicago Home-
owners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1975). 
45. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
46. See generally Comment, Environmental Law-NEPA-Regional Impact State-
ment is Not Required in the Absence of Formal Proposal for Regional Activity-Kleppe 
v. Sierra Club, 5 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 512, 515 (1977); Note, National Environmental Policy 
Act: Federal Officials Are Not Required by the National Environmental Policy Act to File 
an Impact Statement on the Regional Impact of Coal Development on Federal Lands in 
the Northern Great Plains, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 707 (1977); Note, The 
Scope of the Program EIS Requirement: The Need for a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 
STAN. L. REv. 767, 785-92 (1978). 
47. 427 U.S. at 403. 
48. Id. at 399. 
49. Id. at 401. For subsequent cases finding no regional program, see Texas Comm. 
on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1978); Sierra Club v. 
Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1976); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of 
Transp., 531 F.2d 637, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 
(1978). 
50. 595 F.2d at 477-78. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/9
1980] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213 
keting program initiated by the Secretary of Interior.51 In both 
cases, the court found these programs to be clearly within the 
contemplation of NEPA.52 
C. THE N ON EXERCISE OF POWER BY A FEDERAL OFFICIAL DOES NOT 
CALL FOR COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA 
In State of Alaska u. Andrus,53 the Ninth Circuit limited the 
scope of NEP A by ruling that inaction by the Secretary of Interior 
was not major federal action. The State of Alaska instituted a 
wolf-kill program as part of a plan to increase the size of its 
rapidly diminishing caribou herds. Part of the killing was done 
on federal lands within the state's borders. Through the federal 
courts, the Defenders of Wildlife and other animal-welfare groups 
(Defenders) attempted to force the Secretary of Interior to stop 
the program.54 Defenders argued that the Secretary had the power 
to stop the program,and that he was required by NEPA to pre-
pare an EIS before choosing to exercise or refrain from exercising 
that power. The District Court for the District of Columbia issued 
a preliminary injunction compelling the Secretary to halt the 
program.55 The Secretary issued a directive, and the State of 
Alaska stopped the program. The Secretary then appealed the 
preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia which remanded the case without opinion.58 
Shortly thereafter, the State of Alaska brought suit in dis-
trict court seeking a declaration that the Secretary had no power 
to stop the wolf-kill program, or that if he did, he was not required 
to prepare an EISY The Secretary protested that he had no power 
to stop the wolf-kill program and that he had issued his directive 
only to comply with the District of Columbia court order. Defend-
ers, as intervenors, contended that the Secretary did have that 
51. 596 F.2d at 850·51. 
52. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 478; Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 
596 F.2d at 851. 
53. 591 F .2d 537 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Wright, J., and Jameson, D.J.). 
54. [d. at 538-39. Defenders contended that the Secretary was empowered to close 
federal lands to the wolf-kill program by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976), and the AJaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-1627 (1976). 
55. For the opinion of the district court, see Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC 
2111 (D.D.C. 1977). 
56. 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
57. 591 F.2d at 539. The suit was brought in district court in Alaska; the State of 
Alaska was not a party to the District of Columbia litigation. 
9
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power and that he must prepare an EIS even ifhe did not exercise 
that power.58 
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court ruling that 
the Secretary need not prepare an EIS, did not reach the question 
of whether the Secretary had the power to stop the program. 59 The 
court ruled that even if the Secretary had the power to stop the 
wolf-kill program, "his failure to exercise that power-in effect, 
his inaction-was not the type of conduct that. requires an 
[EIS]."80 
The court reasoned that when federal agencies propose to 
take a leading role in activity affecting the environment an EIS 
must be prepared.8t Furthermore, when the primary actors are 
not federal, but rather state or local governments or private par-
ties, "significant federal funding turns what would otherwise be 
a local project into a major federal action."82 Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that "[t]he Ninth Circuit ... has not been 
receptive to arguments that impact statements must accompany 
inactions, or actions that are only marginally federal."83 In State 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 538. 
60. [d. at 540. 
61. [d. See Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 478; Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 
541 F.2d at 445. 
62. [d. See Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814, 
817 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (federal disaster· relief funding for municipal dam and 
reservoir project was major federal action). 
63. 591 F.2d at 541. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323,328 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (mere federal approval of aspects of an airport expansion plan were insufficient 
to constitute major federal action when projects would proceed without federal funding 
or approval); Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Assoc. v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572,580 (9th Cir. 
1974) (the right to object to violations of its loan agreements was but a potential for action 
by a federal agency); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d at 1024·25 (the federal 
action was but a ministerial continuation of an ongoing redevelopment program). Accord, 
City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 1979); City of Highland Park v. 
Train, 519 F.2d 681, 694·95 (7th Cir. 1975); Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162·63 (4th 
Cir. 1973); City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 1972); Bradford Township 
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1972); Civil Improvement 
Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972). Contra, Virginians for Dulles, 541 F.2d 
at 445; Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Okla. v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 243·44 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Okla., 426 U.S. 
776 (1976); Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d 1146, 1149 (2d Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 
at 891; Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972); Hawthorn Envir. Preserv. 
Assoc. v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 1066 
(5th Cir. 1977); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 
(D.D.C. 1974)~ aff'd mem., 627 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). 
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• 
of Alaska, the court found that no federal funds were to be spent, 
nor were federal agents to be employed, in the wolf-kill program.84 
Therefore, the court held, "[ t ]he Secretary's nonexercise of any 
authorities and duties he may possess. . . was, at most, a nonuse 
of a power of supervision. . .. "85 
D. WHAT CONSTITUTES MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION-THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT ApPROACH 
In City of Davis v. Coleman,88 the Ninth Circuit announced 
its standard for requiring an EIS. The City of Davis sought to 
enjoin the building of a highway interchange which was partially 
federally funded, alleging a violation of NEPA because no EIS 
had been prepared. The court rejected the Secretary of Interior's 
argument that the action was of a purely local and private nature, 
holding that the project, its purposes, and its effects were federal 
action.s7 Furthermore, "the main purpose ofthe interchange, and 
its only credible economic justification, [was] to provide access 
, . . for future industrial development"88 which would have sig-
nificant environmental consequences.8U The City of Davis court 
held that the threshold test for requiring preparation of an EIS 
was met when a plaintiff "allege[s] facts which, if true, show 
that the proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of 
environmental quality."70 The court rejected a standard requiring 
that "federal action that significantly affects the environment 
must also be 'major' in an economic or some other nonenviron-
mental sense to trigger the EIS requirement."71 The court rea-
soned: 
To separate the consideration of the magnitude of 
federal action from its impact on the environment 
does little to foster the purposes of the Act .... 
By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be 
64. 591 F.2d at 541. 
65. [d. 
66. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
67. [d. at 677. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 676. 
70. [d. at 673, quoting Environmental Def. Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814,817 n. 
5 (9th Cir. 1973). The City of Davis court further stated: "This standard does not require 
the court to determine whether a challenged project will in fact have significant effects. 
Rather, we are to determine whether the responsible agency has 'reasonably concluded' 
that the project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences." 521 F.2d 
at 673 (emphasis in original). 
71. 521 F.2d at 673 n.15. 
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possible to speak of a "minor federal action signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment," and hold NEPA inapplicable to such 
an action.. . . [T]he activities of federal agen-
cies cannot be isolated from their impact upon the 
environment.72 
Although there is a significant split among the circuits on this 
standard, the Ninth Circuit has clearly placed itself among the 
growing minority. 73 
In this Survey period, the Ninth Circuit extended the City 
of Davis standard to cover proposals for regional action which 
might materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality. 
Although in neither Port of Astoria nor Environmental Defense 
Fund was the City of Davis standard referred to specifically, in 
both cases the court used similar reasoning in deciding whether 
or not to require preparation of an EIS.74 Based on that reasoning, 
the courts' concern with the probability of long-term, significant 
environmental impacts resulting from implementation of those 
regional programs manifested the need for an EIS.75 
State of Alaska was, on the other hand, one of a number of 
attempts by the Ninth Circuit to define the limits of what consti-
tutes major federal action.7' Arguably, there was no major federal 
action that would significantly effect the environment in the 
72. Id., quoting Minesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,1321· 
22 (8th Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
73. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d at 1321-22; Wyo· 
ming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); Envi-
ronmental Def. Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d at 1177; CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 
(1978). But see Cross·Sound Ferry Serv., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725,731 (2d Cir. 
1978); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1088; 
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d at 1032-33; City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d at 259; Ely v. Velde, 
451 F.2d 1130, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1971); San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway 
Dep't, 446 F.2d at 1025; Borough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. 
Supp. 469, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 532 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1976). 
74. See text accompanying notes 34-43 supra. 
75. Environmental Def. Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 861; Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 
695 F.2d at 478. 
76. See cases cited in note 63 supra and accompanying text; see also B. R. S. Land 
Investors v. United States, 596 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (contemplation of 
action by federal agencies does not require an EIS); Lake Berryessa Tenants' Council v. 
United States, 588 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (change of management of 
recreational lake from county to federal agency does not require an EIS); Friends of the 
Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975) (fill for highway taken from possible canal 
site; EIS need not take into account effect of cana!); Robinswood Community Club v. 
Volpe, 506 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1974) (mere participation of federal government in project 
subsequent to effective date of NEPA is not further major federal action). 
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cases the court relied on in its holding,17 In State of Alaska, how-
ever, the court's choice of words in describing the Secretary's 
conduct was determinative in its ruling. 
In discussing the Secretary's conduct as "inaction," the court 
reasoned that such inaction could not be major federal action for 
the purposes of NEPA.78 If the Secretary's conduct had been 
viewed instead as an acquiescence to the conducting of the wolf-
kill program on federal lands, the application of the City of Davis 
standard would require the preparation of an EIS. Defenders met 
that standard when alleging that the program could materially 
degrade environmental quality.79 Although the State of Alaska 
court found that no federal funds were spent nor federal agents 
employed in the wolf-kill program, the City of Davis court re-
jected the argument that "federal action that significantly affects 
the environment must also be 'major' in an economic or some 
other non environmental sense .... "so In bifurcating the test for 
requiring an EIS, the State of Alaska court not only created a 
conflict within the circuit, but has done little to foster the pur-
poses of the Act.81 
II. TIMING 
A. AN EIS SHOULD BE PREPARED AT AN EARLY STAGE WHEN 
ALTERNATIVES ARE STILL POSSIBLE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGE CAN BE MITIGATED 
In Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the question of at what stage of a project 
an EIS must be prepared. In Port of Astoria, BPA argued that 
preparation of an EIS on Phase 2 was premature since the execu-
tion of firm power contracts by its industrial customers other than 
Alumax was a "mere contingency."82 The court, in rejecting this 
contention, found that BPA and its large industrial customers 
were operating under letter agreements which were, in effect, 
industrial firm power contracts. 83 Furthermore, BPA had no in-
77. See cases cited in note 63 supra. 
78. See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
79. See text accompanying note 70 supra. For the allegations of significant environ-
mental impact of the wolf-kill program see Defenders of Wildlife, 9 ERe at 2112-13. 
SO. See text accompanying note 71 supra. See also Defenders of Wildlife, 9 ERe at 
2118. 
81. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
82. 595 F.2d at 478. 
83. [d. 
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tent ion of abandoning its industrial sales policy.s4 Although the 
details of Phase 2 remained unsettled, the court held that NEPA 
did not permit delaying assessment of environmental factors until 
BPA was "faced with the reality of executed contracts and the 
necessity of supplying power to industry .... "85 Rather, the 
court held that "assessment should occur at an early stage when 
alternative courses of action are still possible and environmental 
damage can be mitigated."88 
In requiring the preparation of an EIS for both the water 
marketing program and the option contracts, the court in 
Environmental Defense Fund held that "[a]ny uncertainty 
about the details of subsequent use of the diverted water does not 
obviate the importance of the decision to divert and the necessity 
to evaluate the environmental consequences of that decision."87 
The court rejected the argument that an analysis of environmen-
tal impact was impossible until the option holder had developed 
detailed plans and exercised the option, stating that" [a]n EIS 
at this stage is necessary to assist the government in evaluating 
the impact of the water diversion itself and also alternative com-
mitments of the water."88 The court was concerned that a delay 
in the preparation of an EIS could make all parties less flexible 
since, after a major investment of time and money, it was likely 
that more environmental harm would be tolerated.89 
B. TIMING-A CRUCIAL QUESTION 
Since its opinion in Lathan v. Volpe, DO the Ninth Circuit has 
consistently held that an EIS must be prepared at an early stage 
of a project so that agencies can avoid or minimize adverse envi-
ronmental impacts.91 The court's main concern with delay has 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. 596 F.2d at 851. 
88. [d. at 852. 
89. [d. at 853. 
90. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971) (even though federal officials had not given final 
approval for proposed interstate highway, there was sufficient major federal action to 
require an EIS). 
91. [d. at 1120-21. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d at 794; City of Davis v. Coleman, 
521 F.2d 661, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1975); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d at 327. 
Accord, Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1122, 1125-
26 (5th Cir. 1977); Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1977); Natural Re-
sources Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824, 
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been that more environmental harm would be tolerated.92 Al-
though there may exist a substantial amount of uncertainty 
about the environmental impact of a project, the court has held 
that such uncertainty is not an excuse for failure to prepare an 
EIS.93 What is required is that an agency use its best efforts to 
reasonably forecast environmental impacts and consider reasona-
ble alternatives.9• 
III. STANDING 
Standing to sue is the threshold question in NEPA litigation. 
It has been accepted by all circuits that have considered the 
matter95 that a plaintiff has standing when he alleges "that the 
agency action has caused him an 'injury in fact' and that this 
injury is 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated' by the statute that the plaintiff claims the agency 
violated."98 
845 (2d Cir. 1976); Scientists Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 
at 1086 n. 29; Hawthorn Envir. Preserv. Assoc. v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. at 1101; CEQ 
Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.4 (c), 1502.5 (1978). Contra, Conservation Council 
v. Costanzo, 528 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1975). 
92. Environmental Def. Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 853. 
93. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 676. Accord, Natural Resources Def. Coun· 
cil, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 841; Arkansas Power 
and Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 1223,1236·37 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Scien· 
tists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1098. Contra, Kleppe 
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 402 (1976); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 
F.2d at 230; Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11,17 (8th Cir. 1973); Upper Pecos 
Assoc. v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236·37 (10 Cir. 1971). 
94. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 676; CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14, 
1502.16 (1978). 
95. See Texas Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d at 204 n. 1; 
Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d at 102; City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 
541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 
F.2d at 1325; Ohio ex reI. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1974); Scien· 
tists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1079; Upper Pecos 
Assoc. v. Stans, 452 F.2d at 1235. 
96. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 474 quoting A88ociation of Data Processing 
Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), 
the Supreme Court held that injury to noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic and 
environmental well. being, was a cognizable injury. "But the 'injury in fact' test requires 
more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be 
himself among the injured." [d. at 734·35. In United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669, 689·90 (1973), the Court applied 
the Sierra Club test and found that respondents, who asserted injury to their aesthetic 
and environmental well·being, had standing to sue under NEPA when challenging an 
agency for failure to prepare an EIS. 
For a more expansive and progressive view of standing, see Justice Douglas' dissent 
in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 741·52; C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 
(1974). 
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The Ninth Circuit most recently discussed the issue of stand-
ing in Port of Astoria. Although finding that all other plaintiffs 
had standing, the court denied standing to the Port, since its 
injuries represented "only pecuniary losses and frustrated finan-
cial expectations," which allegedly occurred as a result of the 
relocation of the Alumax plant.V7 In addition, the court rejected 
the Port's asserted interest in preventing estuary and stream pol-
lution within its district that would be caused by the Alumax 
plant, finding that the Port had only a remote interest and was 
not an agency primarily responsible for environmental quality.9s 
In denying the Port standing, the court disregarded the grow-
ing trend to allow standing to any plaintiff who alleges injury of 
anything more than a purely economic interest.99 When the area 
of control and expertise of a state agency may be environmentally 
affected by a federal project, that agency should be entitled to 
standing. 100 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to require an 
EIS for every federal action or to allow every plaintiff standing, 
it has established relatively low threshold tests. 101 In City of 
Davis, the court enunciated good, workable standards for major 
federal action and timing. Unfortunately, in its subsequent at-
tempts to define the breadth and limitations of NEPA, the court 
has continued to rely on a case-by-case analysis instead of one 
based on the City of Davis standards with results such as State 
of A laska. Ten years of court interpretation of NEP A should pro-
vide a sufficient basis for the enunciation of clear and precise 
rules. If it is concerned with the growing volume of litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit should explicitly adopt and apply the City of Davis 
standards so that government agencies, environmental plaintiffs 
97. 595 F.2d at 475. Although the injury to Hermiston Broadcasting Company was 
economic (the power transmission lines for the Alumax plant would interfere with its radio 
broadcasts), the court held that Hermiston's injuries were "causally related to an act that 
lies within NEPA's embrace." [d. at 476. 
98. [d. at 475 (citing legislative history of NEPA and the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1500.9 (c) (1977)). 
99. See Sherwin, On the Firing Line of Environmental Law, 13 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J. 
9, 11 (1974); CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508:14 (1978). 
100. See 595 F.2d at 480 (concurring opinion per Kennedy, J.). 
101. Unlike some other circuits, the Ninth Circuit has not taken a broad substantive 
review approach. See Note, Environmental Law, Ninth Circuit Survey, 6 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 571, 571-572 (1976). 
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and, most importantly, the district courts will clearly understand 
the court's basis for assessing agency compliance with NEPA. 
Robert G. Waligore 
17
Waligore: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
